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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3117 
___________ 
 
DARRELL PARKS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
A. JORDAN, DISCIPLINE HEARING OFFICER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02912) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 3, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  November 21, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Darrell Parks, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the District Court denying his 
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen habeas proceedings 
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm.   
 In 2013, Parks filed a § 2241 petition alleging that his due process rights were 
violated in connection with a disciplinary hearing at which he was found to have 
committed the violation of “Engaging in a Sexual Act.”  Although the disciplinary 
hearing did not result in the loss of any good time credits, Parks alleged that the sanctions 
imposed resulted in the denial of parole.  The District Court denied the petition on the 
merits.  Parks appealed.  We concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the 
petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirmed the judgment as 
modified on that basis.  Parks v. Jordan, 573 F. App’x 233, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2014) (not 
precedential) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005), for the proposition 
that an attack on parole proceedings does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus” where 
success “does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison” 
but rather, “at most [means] new eligibility review, which at most will speed 
consideration of [parole].”). 
 In May 2016, Parks filed a motion to reopen, citing Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(6).  
He asserted that a decision denying parole on November 9, 2015, constituted “newly 
discovered evidence” and that the District Court should have treated his petition as 
raising civil rights claims.  The District Court denied the motion, holding that it was 
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untimely under Rule 60(b)(2) and that Parks failed to demonstrate extraordinary 
circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6).  Parks appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review is for abuse of 
discretion.  Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  We may 
summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6.  
 A Rule 60(b)(2) motion grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed 
within one year after judgment is entered.  See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1).  Here, the 
District Court’s judgment was entered on February 7, 2014.  Parks filed the Rule 60(b) 
motion over two years later, in May 2016.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that 
the District Court properly determined that Parks’ request for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) 
was time-barred.  But even if the motion were considered timely, Parks would not be 
entitled to 60(b) relief based on the November 9, 2015 decision denying parole.  As we 
explained in our prior decision, the “fact that the disciplinary infraction may affect Parks’ 
chances at parole is insufficient to bring his due process claims within the ambit of 
habeas.”  Parks, 573 F. App’x at 235.  Notably, the November 9, 2015 parole decision 
was based on three disciplinary infractions, only one of which Parks seeks to challenge 
here.    
 We also agree that Parks was not entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on his 
assertion that the District Court should have construed his § 2241 petition as raising civil 
rights claims.  According to Parks, the District Court failed to adjudicate claims in his 
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§ 2241 for “retaliation, freedom of speech, and the constitutionally of 28 Code of Federal 
Regulation § 541.8(f).”  Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “available only in cases evidencing 
extraordinary circumstances.”  Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Parks’ contention that the 
District Court misconstrued arguments raised in his habeas petition was a matter for 
appeal, and is not an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  
We note that we previously advised Parks that “[d]ismissal [of his § 2241 petition] should 
be without prejudice to [his] ability to pursue his claims in a civil rights action pursuant 
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).”  Parks, 573 F. App’x at 
236.  Parks does not indicate whether he filed such an action.   
 Because we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Parks’ motion for reconsideration, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.   
 
